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[43 Co2d 107; 271 Po2d 857] 
wilful conduct with reference to the condition of his property 
for there are other reasons plaintiff has not made a case 
here. 'l'his court has not announced such a rule for many 
years and Oettinger· v. supra, 24 Cal.2d 133, casts 
doubt upon it. This court should reexamine such a rule in 
line with the discussion in Fernandez v. Consolidated Fish-
supra, 98 Cal.App.2d 91. 
[L. A. No. 22972. In Bank. June 25, 
HARRY l\IL SCHWARTZ, Appellant, v. SLENDERELLA 
SYSTEMS OF CALIFORNIA, INC. (a Corporation), 
Respondent. 
[1] Trademarks and Trade Names-Unfair Competition-Injunc-
tive Relief.-Under Civ. Code, § 3369, since its amendment 
in 1933 (Stats. 1933, p. 2482), either unfair or fraudulent 
business practice is sufficient to permit injunctive relief against 
unfair competition in use of a trade name; fraud on part of 
junior appropriator is no longer sole ground for such relief. 
[2] !d.-Unfair Competition-Evidence.-In action by retailer of 
women's apparel under trade names of "Slenderella" and 
"Slenderella of Hollywood" to enjoin operator of reducing 
salons from using trade name "Slenderella" in its business, a 
finding that operator's use of such name was in good faith 
and without design or intent to capitalize on retailer's prior 
use of name is sustained by evidence that, before selecting 
name, defendant instituted a nationwide search to avoid use 
of a name that would infringe on rights of another person, 
that name was adopted after advice of counsel was obtained 
that no infringement would result, and that relatively small 
size of retailer's business and limited geographical area in 
which it is advertised and known, as compared with that of 
operator of reducing salon and its affiliates, makes extremely 
unlikely the possibility that purpose of operator's use was to 
capitalize on retailer's business reputation. 
[3] !d.-Unfair Competition-Injunctive Relief.-Injunctive relief 
against unfair use of a trade name may be obtained in situa-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trademarks, Trade Names and Unfair Com-
petition, § 16 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trademarks, Trade Names and 
Unfair Trade § 86 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Trademarks and Trade Names, 
§ 29 [2, 6, 7] Trademarks and Trade Names, § 32; [ 5] Trademarks 
and Trade Names, § 33. 
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tions other than where the 
the basis of relief in such 
injury to reputation and good user 
from an identification of it in minds of public with source of 
second user's goods or services. 
[4] !d.-Unfair Competition-Injunctive Relief.-The senior 
propriator may protect, by injunction, his trade 
limits fixed likelihood of confusion of 
chasers. 
[5] !d.-Unfair Competition-Questions of Law and Fact.-Al-
though many factors may enter into determination whether 
use of a specific trade name is likely to result in a confusion 
of source, question is primarily one of fact to be determined 
from all circumstances of particular case. 
[6] !d.-Unfair Competition-Evidence.-In action by retailer of 
women's apparel to enjoin operator of reducing salons from use 
of name of "Slenderella" used by retailer, evidence does not 
compel conclusion that use of such name by a junior appro-
priator will destroy its novelty and dilute its value where 
there were several other state and federal registrations of 
name, where retailer testified that he had heard name used 
in "the trade circles" in women's wear before he decided to 
apply it to his own business, and where name itself is sug-
gestive of uses for which registrations have been obtained, 
notably health products, scientific aids to slenderizing, and 
wearing apparel for large-sized women. 
[7] !d.-Unfair Competition-Evidence.-In action by retailer of 
women's apparel to enjoin operator of reducing salons from use 
of name of "Slenderella" used by retailer, evidence does not 
compel conclusion as matter of law that confusion of public 
is likely from use of identical or similar trade names where 
the two businesses are inconsistent with one another, where 
much of difficulty may be attributed to newness of defendant's 
business, and where there has been no evidence of any member 
of the public purchasing goods or services of either of the 
parties on basis of reputation of the other. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to enjoin assertedly wrongful use of a trade name. 
Judgment adverse to plaintiff affirmed. 
Samuel Maidman :for Appellant. 
Newlin, Holley, 'rackabury & Johnston and Hudson B. 
Cox :for Respondent. 
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Harry !Yr. Schwartz sued Slenderella 
Inc., to enjoin the assertedly wrongful 
use of a trade name. His appeal from an adverse judgment 
for decision questions as to the sufficiency of the 
evidence and the findings to support the judgment. 
Some of the facts ·were by stipulation. Counsel 
also that the trial (·our't should consider as evidence 
photographs, advertising matter, the sta-
used by each of the partie;;;, and an affidavit concern-
a trade-mark search made by counsel for the defendant. 
'l't1ese facts are undispnted: 
F·or several years, Schwartz has engaged in the retail sale 
of women's apparel under thP trade names of '' Slenderella'' 
and "Slenderella of Hollywood." At the time this action 
was tried, he operated two stores in the Los Angeles area, 
catering primarily to larger-sized ·women, and specializing 
in large-size and half-size garments. He began using the 
name "Slenderella of Hollywooll" in 1939 when he opened 
his flrst store and filed with the clerk of Ijos Angeles County 
a certificate of doing business nnder that fictitious name. 
(Civ. Code, §§ 2466, 2468.) Schwartz opened his second 
"Slenderella" store in 194 7. 
The name '' Slenderella'' had beeu used previously in Cali-
fornia by one ,J. P. Schwarze, who registered it in 1933 with 
the Secretary of State for use in eonneetion >vith the manu-
facture and sale of wheat flour. At about the same time, 
one Henry Semeria beg·an using it for his business of selling 
women's apparel in stores located in San Francisco and 
Sacramento. Both of these prior uses were discontinued 
before Schwartz begall his business. 
In 1944 Schwartz registered with the Secretary of State 
the names "Slenderella" and "Slenderella of Hollywood" 
for use in connection with the sale of women's apparel. 
A.pproximately 50 or 60 per cent of the merchandise sold 
by him bears one of these names, either on the goods or 
their containers. By reason of bis business experience, and 
through the care and high standards maintained by him, he 
has established a good reputation, and his merchandise has 
become known to the users and prospective purchasers of 
it under his trade names. He advertises his business under 
these names in local newspapers and by mailing cards and 
circulars to 17,500 customers. The total annual advertising 
cost is between $1,500 and $4,400. 
Slenderella Systems is a California corporation affiliated 
C.2d 
tl1e same name m 
salons 
"'"'"'"'"+''~ any women's 
its associates mmmfaeture or sell any women 
accessories. 
maintains 
owns nor 
nor does it or 
or 
Prior to December, 1 the affiliated had 
operated under the trade name of "Silooete." In that year, 
one of the acquired by assignment the rights of 
Erika Schneider in a business using the name '' Slenderella'' 
as a trade-mark. Schneider had registered the name with 
the United States Patent Offiee in 1941 for use in eonnection 
with the manufacture and sale of sugarless candy for health 
purposes. Those foods vvere not sold in California before 
the respondent corporation was formed and began using them 
in connection with its reducing eourses. 
Before adopting the name "Slenderella Systems," the 
affiliates instituted a trade-mark search in each state into 
which it was contemplated that the business would extend. 
Several previous registrations of the name, both federal and 
state, were discovered as well as unregistered uses of it. 
The Schwartz registration \vas one of those then found, but 
the health system's use of the name was in good faith and 
without intent to capitalize on the reputation Schwartz had 
built up. Since it began using the name, Slenderella Systems 
has advertised it in the metropolitan newspapers of Los 
Angeles, and by 1952, had expended in excess of $15,000 
for that purpose. The respondent and its affiliated companies 
maintain uniformity in their general advertising throughout 
the several states in which they operate, their achertising 
being substantially the same as that used by them --when they 
operated under the trade name '' Silooete. '' 
By reason of the similarity in names, Schwartz has re-
ceived some misdirectrd mail and telephone calls intended 
for Slenderella Systems. Some of his customers have gone 
to the respondent's salons in the belief that Schwartz oper-
ated women's clothing stores at those locations. Other cus-
tomers have stated to him or his employees that since he is in 
the weight-reducing business they would rather flrst reduce 
their weight before purchasing large or half-size apparel 
from him. 
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to carry on 
business under the name '' his customers 
HlH1 business associates will be misled and defrauded into 
t}w.t tbe two llllsinesses are one. If he IS denied 
his business will be m 
i1 s -will 1:1 nd in loss of 
The trial court mude fi in accordance \dth the stated 
ft further found that the 's use of the 
trade Harne '' Slcnderella'' in an unrelated and nonc•:nn 
dYe business has not caused damage or to Schwartz 
and has not resulted iu the deception or of the 
public. the instances confusion which have 
occurred, it found thai " [ s Inch confusion arises from the 
similal'ity of namef' and is the result principally of inatten-
tion aud rarelessness on the part of persons so confused." 
In its opinion, such confusion, "no doubt, has been or will 
be of short duration." 
In attacking the jm1gment denying an injunction, and 
the findings upon which it is Schwartz contends that 
the trial court bas lWcrl? emphasized the defendant's good 
faith and the fact that thn parties are engaged in noncompet-
iug businesses. On the other hand, he argues, it has given 
too little -weight to the incidents of confusion e;;;tablished by 
the record and to the d1araetcr of "Sienderella" as a fanciful 
a IHI cl istinetiYe trade name. 
[1] Before the amendment to section 3369 of the Civil Code 
in HJ:33 (Stats. 19:\:3, p. 2482). in on1er to obtain injunctive 
relief against an assert0cl aet of nnfair com petition in the 
nse of a trarle name, it \Yas necessary to establish fraud on 
the part of the jrmior appropriator. American Auto-
mobile .1-lssn. v. Amu·ican Automobile 0. Assn., 216 CaL 125, 
135-1~~6 [13 P.2d 707].) 'l'he statute now provides that 
nn fair rompetition may include an unfair or fraudulent 
hnsiness praetiee, a11d either gronnrl is sufficie11t to permit 
injunetiYe rnlief. (1JlcCord Co. v. Plotnick, 108 CaLApp.2d 
:3~)2, :3!J;) [2:l9 P.2c1 82]; illrw8wecney Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Trtrrm/1:no, 106 Cal.App.2rl !104. 5]8-514 [235 P.2d 266] 
TVood v. Peffer, 55 CaLApp.2d 1J6. 124 [130 P.2d 220].) 
[2] Although Schwartz asserts that "there is an inherent 
lad: of good faith when one appropriates the identical trade 
name of a \Yell-establishef'l bn;;irwss," the finding of the trial 
eonrt, that reflpondcnt's use of the name "was in good faith 
and without design or intent to eapitalize upon the plaintiff's 
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prior use of said name," is substantial evidence. 
The record sho;,vs that, before the name, the re-
spondent instituted a nationwide search in order to avoid 
use of a name that wonld infringe upon the another 
person. The name was adopted after advice of counsel was 
obtained that no would result. 
the small size of Sch>vartz bw;i ness 
limited geographical area in which it is advertised and known. 
as compared with that of the and its 
makes extremely unlikely the possibility that the purpose of 
the latter's use was to capitalize npon Schwartz's business 
reputation. 
[3] Since the decision in Academy of Motion Picture Arts 
& Sciences v. Benson, 15 Ca1.2d 685 [104 P.2d 650], it is 
established, as the respondent concedes, that injunctive relief 
against the unfair use of a trade name may be obtained in 
situations other than where the parties are in direct com-
petition. (1}facSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, supra 
at 106 Cal.App.2d 513; Johnston v. ,20th Century-Fo.x Pilm 
Corp., 82 CaLApp.2d 796, 818 [187 P.2d 4741; v. 
Charles, 77 Cal.App.2d 64, 70-71 [175 P.2d 69]; see 40 
Cal.L.Rev. 571; contra: Yellow Cab Co. San Diego v. 
Sachs, 191 Cal 238 [216 P. 33, 28 A.hR 105]; Dunston v. 
Los Angeles Van & S. Co ... 165 Cal. 89 [131 P. 115], and 
cases cited; Weatherford v. E'ytchison, 90 Cal.App.2d 379 
[202 P.2d 1040]; Scutt v. Bassett, 86 Ca1.App.2d 373, 376 
[194 P.2d 781] .) rl'he basis of relief in sueh circumstances 
is the possibility of injury to the reputation and good will 
of the business of the prior user from an identification of 
it in the minds of the public with the source of the second 
user's goods or services. [4] The senior appropriator may 
protect, by injunction, his trade name "within the limits 
fixed by the likelihood of confusion of prospective pur-
chasers." (Rest., Torts, § 730, com. b; JJ.IacSweeney 
Enter·prises, Inc. v. Tarantino, snpra, at 106 Cal.App.2d 
512-513; Winfield v. Charles, supra, at 77 Cal.App.2d 70-
71.) [5] Altlwugh many factors may enter into a deter-
mination of whether the nse of a specific trade name is likely 
to resnlt in a confusion of source, the question is 
one of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances 
of a particular case. (JitacSweeney Inc. v. 1'ar-
aniino, supr·a, p. 518; Winfield v. Charles, supra, p. 71 Pohl 
v. Anderson, 18 Cal.App.2d 241, 242 [56 P.2d 992]; see 68 
C.J. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and Unfair Competition, 
414-418, § 112.) 
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and fanciful name, 
many cases have 
that allow 
the name used in ''the 
in women wear before he decided 
circles'' 
to his own 
business. 
'fhe name consists of a defined word to which 
has been added a Latin diminutive denoting the feminine 
It of the uses for which 
notably health scientific aids to 
large-sized women. 
include: slenderets, slenderoids, slendex, 
slender form, slenderlines, 
thinderella, Cinderella, slenderize, slenderette, slimderella, 
slendorita, slimadonna, and slender-lee. 
To hold that confusion of source as to his anu 
the services wm be unlikely, Schwartz contends, 
the factual instances of confusion shown the 
evidence. He asserts that the trial court has the 
serious of such confusion. Here the parties cater to 
the same class of the public, the argument continues, 'and 
it is not difficult to perceive that both appellant and re-
spondent are competing for the same dollar." 
[7] Although factual instances of confusion may support 
a determination that confusion of the public is likely from 
the use of identical or similar trade names, they do not compel 
that conclusion as a matter of law. v. Pnb-
79 738; Lerner Stores Corp. v. 
162 F.2d 160, 163; American A-uto. Ins. Co. v. Amer-
wan Auto 184 F.2d To some at 
reason of the apparent uJxov""'" 
catering to the apparel needs women, while 
at the same time conducting a business specializing in the 
U4 
weight reduction oi' 
the trial stated 
the 
eond nsions 
source. e uti r•" 
ports that determination. 
'l'lw jnrlgment is affirme(1. 
Gibson, C. J ., ,J.. am1 
CARTER, J.--I dissent. 
No far~tual here 
stipulation of the 
trial enurt. The was made on 
that all the faets were to. 'rhere remained 
the trial court to do the law to the a process 
involving matters of law, not fact. 'l'hat is the whole tenor 
of the reporter's transcript. For the 
stipulation defendant's counsel said: " 
great dispnte lwt\we11 m; il" to the fad''· inYolycd in ihc ease." 
'rhis is particularly t"ne as to tlw two discussed 
in the majority opinion. whether the was confused 
and whether defendant acted in faith. This is further 
evinced by the trial court in lis memorandum It 
may be noted that sueh cpinion, relied upon the 
majority, was not made a part of the reeord in this ease. A 
purported copy of it is attaeherl to defendant's brief and 
answer to petition for h0a h~r thh court. 
therein that the r·onrt was not 
it m iscone<"iYefl th<" law. T i
sary (the majority concedes it is 
foregoing it will appear that the 
tivc businesses, not eYen 
if competition is a 
m're appealing to the same segment of the 
women, and to cater to the wishes of tl1at segment. 
it is said: "It is not the nsf' of the name that is 
*'l'he latter is not r!'ally a faf'tor in tht' as I will lnter point out. 
uot 
the trial by 
" (em-
facts are: 
m California 
incidents 
plaintiff establishment have received 
calls intended for the defendant. 
said misdirected telephone calls have con-
of the defendant's name in the Central 
of l10S 
'' 3. That many of the 's customers and prospective 
customers have as to plaintiff's ownership or con-
nection with defendant's establislm1ents which require the 
of time in the explanation the plaintiff and his 
to these inq nir ies. 
"4. That certain of plaintiff's customers and prospective 
customers have goue to the defendant's locations in Hollywood 
and Hills believing that tl1e plaintiff had operated 
women's shops at the said locations. 
'' 5. That customers and prospective customers have stated 
to plaintiff and his employees that since defendant is in the 
they would rather first reduce their 
or half-size apparel from the 
'' 6. That the plaintiff and his employees have been asked 
on recurring occasions to prices for reducing treatments, 
necessitating of time to make explanations. 
"7. That the plaintiff is considering opening a branch store 
in Hills upon the termination of his lease of the Holly-
wood store. 
'' 8. 'I'hat some not including numbered street ad-
intended for the defendant's establishments, have 
been received by plaintiff; conversely, I don't think 
2\ilr. Cox would have any objection to saying there is a pos-
sibility, which >ve don't know that some of our mail may 
have been delivered to the defendant." 
There is no escape from the proposition that those facts 
show that the public was confused and misled; that it thought 
plaintiff's and defendant's businesses were the same; that it 
thought a reducing product of or treatment by defendant 
had its source in plaintiff's business and plaintiff was re-
confusion 
businesses 
based upon facts to the record 
but is aJso more than another way of that 
there can be no actionable infringement of a trade-mark 
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that the 
come from 
be 
person, it was also 
other' we have evident 
it wm be seen. a confusion 
while the 
purpose 
conceivable 
defendant's to have 
or that the business of the plaintiff 
to have connection with the business 
18 
of the 
may 
of immediate trade but 'may 
his reputation, or it may 
tending his trade to I he 
using the mark.' 'rhe 
endangered in various 
may be brought into 
"While confusion of 
litigants are actually 
may arise between 
''In a suit for an 
for recovery of 
be shown." 
''Proof actual 
is clear that the 
circumstances or ihat it 
as 
is 
may further be 
of his 
from an action 
£u a single instance. In rare cases, the extent to 
confusion can be in whole or to 
of the marks or to other considerations may be open to doubt. 
If, however, the is able to a substantial 
number of witnesses to attest that, of 
course, will indicate the of confusion really 
may be.'' (Emphasis added Callman, Unfair Competition 
and Trade-Marks (2d , voL 3, p. Proof of actual 
confusion requires the conclusion that confusion is probable. 
(See Grocers Baking Co. v. 132 F.2d 498; Standard 
Oa Co. v. Michie, 34 F.2d 802; S. S. Co. v. Winget-
K1;ckern1:ck, 96 F. 2d In the case it was said at 
page 987: "\Yhile trademark issues may be 
presented and determined on the basis of a bare 
of the marks, it is evident that an ilifferent situ-
ation is prese!lted wherr> tbe eourt the marks 
heforP it hnt evidence of actual in the trade in 
the nse thereof. \Vhatever the 
be upon mere1y 
be govenwd evidence shows as to 
the view of and effect 
In addition, 
(Ern-
that 
of 
Hence 
'' and the identical word 
and defendant. Both appeal to the 
same segment of the stout women. The leading case 
A ttnt .Jemima JYiills Co. v. &: Co., 247 F. 407 [159 
C.C.A. LH.A. 1918C , cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 
S.Ct. 62 L.Ed. is in point There the trade-
mark \Yas used plaintiff in the sale of flour. Defendant 
mxs it in the sale of syrup. The court reversed the 
trial court's refusal of stating at page 409 : ''To use 
the same mark, as the defendants have done, is, 
in our opinion, evidence of intention to make something out 
of it--either to the benefit of the complainant's reputa-
tion or of its advertisement or to forestall the extension of 
its trade. There is no other conceivable reason why they 
should have appropriated this precise mark. The taking 
wrongful, we think the defendants have no equity to 
n.,..,,,.,,~,. them against an injunction, unless they get it from 
a eonsideration now to be examined. 
"It is said t1Jat even a technical trade-mark may be appro-
by anyone in any market for goods not in competition 
with those of the prior user. This was the view of the court 
below in that no one wanting syrup could possibly 
be made to take flour. But we think that goods, though dif-
may be so related as to fall ·within the mischief which 
should and flour are both food prod-
and food products commonly used together. Obviously 
HJC public, or a part of seeing this trade-mark on a 
syrup, would conclude that it was made by the complainant. 
not do so, if it were used for flatirons. 
"''ad.Hcuu's reputation is put in the hands 
It will enable them to get the ben<~fit of 
and advertisement. 'l'l1ese we 
think are property which should be protected in 
" These principles are in line with the legion of cases 
holding that in an action for an injunction actual confusion 
need not be established; probability is enough. (See cases 
collected Unfair Competition and Trademarks (2d 
name. 
confusion 
of Lerner Stores 
addition the court was 
Much space is 1P an ''lHIPavor to establish that 
defendant did not act in had faith~did not 
ness in the same area 
defendant was not 
take. 
the law. 
or m1s-
or bad faith is 110t signifi-
bc the law that 
not intend to deceive, when 
June 1954] LIVINGSTON RocK ETC. Co. v. CouNTY OF L.A. 121 
[43 C.2d 121; 272 P.2d 4J 
is not an essential factor to the granting of such 
is to endeavor to lift oneself by one's own bootstraps. 
On the record before this court plaintiff is clearly entitled 
to in;jnnctive relief against defendant, and the judgment 
should, be reversed. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Thc evidence and the findings, 
in my entitle the plaintiff to injunctive relief and 
reversal of the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 21, 
1954. Carter, J., Traynor, ,J., and Schauer, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L.A. No. 22991. In Bank. June 25, 1954.] 
LIVINGSrl'ON llOCK .AND GRAVEL COMPANY (a Cor-
poration) et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS 
ANGELES, Appellant. 
[1] Zoning-Police Power.-Zoning ordinances, when reasonable 
in objrct and not arbitrary in operation, constitute a justifiable 
exercise of police power. 
[2] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-The rights of users of 
property as those rights existed under prevailing zoning con-
ditions at time of adoption of rezoning ordinance must be 
protected. 
[3] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.--A provision which ex-
empts existing nonconforming uses is ordinarily included in 
rezoning ordinances because of hardship and doubtful consti-
tutionality of compelling immediate discontinuance of non-
conforming uses. 
[4] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-Zoning legislation looks 
to future in regulating district development and eventual 
li(1uidation of nonconforming uses within prescribed period 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Zoning, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Zon-
ing, § 10. 
[3] Sec Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Zoning, § 19; Am.Jur., Zoning, 
§ 146 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 6, 7, 10] Zoning; [5] Constitutional 
Law, § 91; [8] Administrative Law, § 19; [9] Administrative Law, 
§ 22. 
